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Abstract
The fluctuations in incomes inherent in rural communities can be attenuated
by reciprocal insurance. We develop a model of such insurance based on
self-interested behaviour and voluntary participation. One individual assists
another only if the costs of so doing are outweighed by the benefits from
expected future reciprocation. A distinction is made between general
reciprocity where the counter obligation is expected but not certain and
balanced reciprocity where there is a firm counter obligation. This firm
counter obligation is reflected by including a loan or quasi-credit element in
any assistance. It is shown how this can increase the insurance provided and
how it may explain the widespread use of quasi-credit in rural communities.
Moreover it is shown that for a range of parameter values consistent with
evidence from three villages in southern India, a simple scheme of gift-giving
and quasi-credit can do almost as well as theoretically better but more
complicated schemes.
JEL Classification: D89, O16, O17.
Keywords: implicit contract, gift-giving, reciprocity, quasi-credit.
Jonathan P. Thomas
Department of Economics
University of St. Andrews








United Kingdom1 Three Villages
We will brie‡y describe three village communities, one from India, one from Africa and
one from Asia. Purakkad is a small …shing village in Kerala state in southern India. The
…shermen of the village have a choice either of beach-seining or going deep-sea …shing
with lines on non-motorized boats. They …sh when the weather permits and when there
is evidence of …sh which means that on average they …sh every second or third day. When
they …sh, they land and market their catch on the beach. There are large day-to-day
variations in the catch of any one …shing team and large variations in catches across
di¤erent teams on any given day. Some teams will be lucky and happen upon good shoals
of …sh and land good catches and others will be less fortunate and net only a meagre haul.
But the chances are that the luck will even itself out and those fortunate today may be
less fortunate tomorrow. The response of the …shermen to the variability in their catch is
documented by Platteau and Abraham (1987) and Platteau (1991). Those …shermen who
have been unlucky enough to have a bad catch are able to borrow interest-free from those
who have been more fortunate. This system of credit is very active with each …sherman
undertaking a loan or borrowing or making a repayment on average every other day. It
also appears to be very e¤ective in reducing the variability of consumption relative to the
variability in their income.
The Basarwa of northern Botswana are semi-nomadic subsistence farmers who grow
mainly maize and sorghum. They own relatively few animals and borrow ma…sa cattle
from wealthier cattle owners. The Basarwa get the milk and draught power of the ma…sa
cattle (and possibly any calves) but must return the animal after the season. They stay
in one place only for a few seasons and then move usually to a new employer or when
the current employer no longer needs them. In addition they face important sources of
variation in their crop yields from regional drought, crop disease and pests. The pests are
clearly an important worry. As one of the Basarwa put it: the cattle eat and destroy the
crops, the birds eat the sorghum, the monkeys eat the maize, the jackals eat the watermelon
and duikers eat the beans. The Basarwa have been studied by the anthropologist Elizabeth
Cashdan (see Cashdan, 1985) who …nds that there is widespread evidence of food-sharing
amongst the Basarwa with gifts mainly of meat but also grain and milk given to those in
need. Small gifts are also given frequently ”to reinforce the social relationships that can
be called upon for more signi…cant gifts should the need arise”. This system of reciprocal
giving helps stabilize food consumption and is a ”cost-e¤ective way of attaining security
for this population”.
The rice terraces in the Cordillera mountains of northern Luzon island in the Philip-
pines are justi…ably famous and the mountains are home to many isolated rice-farming
villages. Lund and Fafchamps (1997) report on a survey of four villages in the area.2 All
2This survey is probably unique as it was explicitly designed to gather information on gifts, loans and
transfers.
1206 households in the survey participated in gift-giving or receiving in the 9 months of
the survey and the majority also participated in giving or receiving of loans. Over 80% of
these transactions were between households within the same village and virtually all others
were with adjacent villages. Nearly all expected to transact with the same partner again.
Over half the households reversed their roles with their loan partner within the nine month
survey period. So givers (lenders) became receivers (borrowers) and vice-versa. Most of
the loans and gifts were for consumption purposes. None of the loans were written down
explicitly, less than 3% speci…ed a repayment schedule, only 1% required collateral and
over 80% were interest-free. Of the loans repaid within the survey period nearly 20% were
not repaid in full. In only one case did the lender claim that a default had taken place. In
all other cases the lenders agreed to forgive part of the loan due to the borrowers’ di¢cult
circumstances.
2 Deductivist Approach
Nearly one-half of the world live in small rural communities like these villages. These three
examples illustrate the social structure of a village economy and the informal insurance
arrangements in which they engage. The gifts, loans and transfers between the villagers
are predominately for consumption purposes;3 they provide some insurance against a bad
catch or a bad harvest but are informal as there are no written records, no legal procedures
to enforce repayments, no collateral; and an understanding that debts may be delayed
or forgiven if circumstances dictate. The loans and gift transactions are personalized
rather than pure market transactions and are embedded in the social structure of the
village.4 Resources are allocated not by markets but by non-market institutions that act as
partial and imperfect substitutes for the absent or missing markets.5 The village economy
is a relatively small, relatively closed, relatively cohesive, near subsistence, agricultural
economy.
There has been considerable discussion of informal insurance arrangements in rural
communities by economists, ethnographers, sociologists and social anthropologists (see,
e.g., Bliss and Stern, 1982; Ho¤, Braverman, and Stiglitz, 1994; Bardhan, 1989; Cashdan,
1990; Firth and Yamey, 1964; Sahlins, 1974; Schwatz, 1967). This literature emphasizes
that life in village economies is aleatory. Risk is the predominant fact of life. Risk to
crops from poor weather or disease or pests, the risk of losing ones animals and the risk
of illness. James Scott starts his book on “The Moral Economy of the Peasant” with
3Informal arrangements are also used for the …nancing of productive investments and indivisible goods.
A common approach is the use of rotating savings and credit associations (Roscas), see Besley, Coate, and
Loury (1993).
4On the importance of embedding economic transactions within a social structure see Granovetter
(1985).
5Absent complete markets, consumption and production decisions cannot be separated and rationality
is decoupled from pro…t maximization (see Lipton (1968)).
2a quote from R. Tawney: “the position of the rural population is like a man standing
permanently up to the neck in water, so that even a ripple is su¢cient to drown him”.
The current paper concerns itself with one of the ways in which people can respond to
risk, namely by insuring each other. We depart, however, from the vast majority of the
literature by adopting a highly deductivist methodology. That is, suppose we were in the
situation faced by, say, the …sherman in Purakkad, knowing more or less what the risks
are and knowing that if someone fails to repay there are no courts to enforce the payment,
how would we best design an arrangement that provides as much insurance as possible
in these circumstances? We then compare the features of this arrangement with existing
institutions.
To be more precise, we shall construct a simple model of mutual insurance based on
self-interested behaviour. The parameters of the model will be calibrated to re‡ect what
is known about such factors as attitudes to risk and the degree of risk faced in typical
village economies. We shall then compare the best mutual insurance arrangement in the
model with some of the features of insurance arrangements that have been documented in
the literature to see whether the approach taken here can plausibly explain these features.
More precisely, we shall show that a stylized version of the documented arrangements can
come close to the “ideal” arrangement according to the theory; in this sense our …nding is
that the theoretical approach advanced can explain general features of informal insurance
arrangements.6
This deductivist approach may be contrasted with the inductive approach, or more
functional approach, which starts with observations about what institutions or informal
arrangements are used and then develops a model to explain the observations. One advan-
tage of the deductivist approach is that it forces one to be very explicit about the economic
environment. Another is that it is better suited to the evaluation of policy changes.7 The
disadvantage is that it does not provide an explanation of the evolution of the institutions
as a response to a changing environment. Rather it assumes that the institution exists to
solve a given problem.
6In a related paper, Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (1997) …t a model of an e¢cient arangement to data
from 3 Indian villages, and argue that this model provides a superior account of the data to a number of
competing models.
7The ability to assess policy changes is especially important as previous policy interventions have often
proved only moderately and patchily successful, such as the green revolution, and others have at best proved
only partially successful and at worst have been counter-productive (Braverman and Guasch, 1986). Even
the more recent and thoughtful interventions like the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh or the BKK in Java,
which have been successful in their own terms of promoting savings, have been questioned as to whether
they actually improved welfare (Townsend, 1996).
33G i f t - G i v i n g a n d R e c i p r o c i t y
Gift-giving and reciprocal exchange appears to be pervasive in rural communities. Sahlins
(1974) provides numerous examples ranging from studies of the Eskimo to studies of the
!Kung to studies of Australian Aboriginals. History also o¤ers many examples of reci-
procity, for example in medieval villages (Townsend, 1993) and also in archaic periods.8
Sahlins (developing the ideas of Malinowski, 1978) identi…es three types of reciprocal
exchange, generalized, balanced and negative. Generalized and negative reciprocity are
at two extremes with balanced reciprocity somewhere in the middle. Generalized reci-
procity (also called weak or inde…nite reciprocity) may take the form of a “gift” (see, e.g.,
Malinowski, 1978; Mauss, 1990). This is not to say that the gift does not imply a counter
obligation. Rather the reckoning of the debt cannot be overt and the recipient has only a
vague obligation to reciprocate. Reciprocation may be in full or may be in part; it may
come soon or it may never come. The test of generalized reciprocity according to Sahlins
is whether failure to reciprocate causes the giver to stop giving. Balanced reciprocity is
applied to transaction which involve a more complete reckoning of the counter obligation.
There must be a tangible quid pro quo. It may be contemporaneous as in normal exchange
transaction but it need not be. There will however be a …rm expectation that a counter
gift of approximately equal worth will be o¤ered within some reasonable time period. The
test of balanced reciprocity is the inability to tolerate one-way ‡ows. The relationship be-
tween the parties will be disrupted if there is a failure to reciprocate. At the other extreme
is negative reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). This is a situation where one party seeks to gain
at the other’s expense. Theft comes into this category as would dishonestly supplying
inferior goods.
Platteau (1997) argues that, in the context of informal insurance, gift-giving when
need arises is a form of generalized reciprocity, but that informal loans or credit (possibly
combined with gifts) corresponds to balanced reciprocity. Gift-receiving in times of need
does not create any extra obligation on the part of the recipient beyond what already
existed. If one household unfortunately su¤ered a series of bad shocks, there will be a
one-way ‡ow of resources in its favor. The evidence from the villages of Kerala state,
northern Botswana, the Philippines and elsewhere suggests, however, that informal loans,
or a combination of informal loans and gifts, are much more common than simple gifts.
That is, a transfer of resources today is balanced by a counter obligation of repayment
at some point in the future. That credit can be, and is, used as insurance has long been
recognized (see, e.g., Eswaren and Kotwal, 1989): borrow when times are bad and repay
when times are good. These loans may however, be interpreted better as a type of quasi-
8T h eb o o kb yG o r d o n( 1 9 7 5 )o ne c o n o m i ca n a l y s i sb e f o r eA d a mS m i t hb e g i n sw i t ht h ew r i t i n g so ft h e
greek didactic poet Hesiod who lived around 700BC. One of Hesiod’s poems is Work and Days where he
writes about a collection on independent farming households. The poem can be considered as a series of
aphorisms on how best to keep the household wealthy (Millet, 1984). One part of the poem deals with
reciprocity: ”Take fair measure from your neighbour and pay him back fairly with the same or better if
you can; so that if you are in need afterwards, you may …nd him sure.” ( lines 359-361)
4credit as they have an implicit and ‡exible rather than an explicit and rigid repayment
schedule.9
From the point of view of insurance, generalized reciprocity or gift-giving as need
arises is the best arrangement. Balanced reciprocity, that corresponds (in this context) to
credit or quasi-credit arrangements, is less e¤ective. For example, a household facing one
adverse shock may borrow to stabilize its consumption. Should it then immediately su¤er
another adverse shock, it is in a worse position than after the …rst shock as it has repayment
obligations on the borrowing already made, and being less willing to accumulate even more
debt, it will be forced to cut consumption. Had it received a gift without counter obligation
after the …rst shock, it is in no worse position when the second shock hits, and provided
another gift is made, it will be able to maintain its consumption. It may be quite puzzling,
then, why these quasi-credit arrangements are used in place of or as a supplement to gifts,
but we shall argue that quasi-credit components arise quite naturally when reciprocity
is voluntary rather than enforced and is based on rational action: one makes a loan or
a gift because the future bene…ts exceed the current cost. A gift or loan is made in the
anticipation of being a recipient in the future. I give or lend to you because I anticipate the
bene…ts exceed the cost and I know you will reciprocate at some point as you will have a
similar calculation to make. The problem with a pure insurance/gift arrangement, where
the only counter obligation on the receiver is the general obligation to respond likewise
if the giver is in need in the future, is that this counter obligation may not be su¢cient
to induce the giver to part with resources today. This can be seen clearly if the giver is
c o n … d e n tt h a th eo rs h ew i l ln o tb ei nn e e do fh e l pi nt h ei m m e d i a t ef u t u r e ,s ot h a tt h e
general counter obligation has little value. On the other hand, if there is a credit element
to the transaction, the giver will expect some future reward—repayment on the loan—over
and above any reciprocal insurance promise, and this may provide su¢cient incentive to
induce the giver to part with resources today. An interesting example of a pure insurance
arrangement which su¤ers from an incentive problem is described in Platteau (1997). He
cites the case of Senegalese small-scale …shermen who band together in order to provide
a rescue service for fellow …shermen who get into di¢culty at sea. They also promise
to help repair or replace damaged or lost equipment. However, Platteau …nds that these
informal rescue organizations often break down as those who contribute but do not receive
any bene…t become frustrated with the arrangement.10 The argument presented here is
that such ideal but potentially unstable arrangements can be made stable by adding a
quasi-credit element.
9Udry (1994) …nds evidence from northern Nigeria that repayments on loans are state contingent. On
average a borrower with high income repays 20.4% more than he borrowed but a borrower who has another
bad year repays 0.6% less than he borrowed. Moreover repayments are contingent on the lender’s position.
A lender with a good realization of income receives on average 5% less than he lent, but a lender with a bad
realization receives on average 11.8% more. Thus repayments appear to contain a “gift” element tailored
to the circumstances of either party. (See also the discussion of the rice terraces in Luzon in Section 1.)
10It may be argued that a good reason for pulling out of the arrangement is because one learns of negative
characteristics of other …shermen. This does not, however, seem to be a problem here. Those rescued were
not seen as being imprudent or bad …shermen, merely unlucky ones.
5Implicit in the above is the idea that the consequence of failing to hold to one’s side of
an informal risk-sharing arrangement is exclusion from the arrangement in future.11 The
general idea that some insurance is possible in informal settings where the only incentive
to sacri…ce current resources is the threat of exclusion from the insurance institution in
future can be found in Posner (1980) and Posner (1981) and more explicitly in the work on
self-enforcing agreements by Telser (1980). It was applied to village economies by Kimball
(1988) and Fafchamps (1992) who showed that it was possible for such a system to work
and by Coate and Ravallion (1993) who examined a situation of reciprocal gift-giving but
ignored the quasi-credit component. The approach we adopt is essentially game theoretic.
What we do, in contrast to this literature which has concentrated on demonstrating that
such arrangements are possible or has looked at properties of speci…c arrangements, is to
…nd the best or “e¢cient” insurance arrangement given that any agent will renege on the
arrangement if it is in their own self-interest so to do. We do this in such a way that the
solution can be computed and a comparison made with existing institutions and insurance
arrangements.12
The fear of exclusion from future insurance is of course not the only possible reason
to reciprocate and there are certainly other possible answers which have been suggested.
Other game theoretic models have been suggested by Camerer (1988) and Raub and
Weesie (1990) and Goerlich (1996-97). Camerer (1988) treats gift-giving as a signalling
game where the gift is a signal or symbol of one’s intention to invest in a relationship.13 He
demonstrates how in the equilibrium of this game gift-giving can be mutual and ine¢cient
(the recipient values the gift less than the giver). In a di¤erent but related vein Raub and
Weesie (1990) study an extended version of the repeated prisoners’ dilemma game.14 They
examine an in…nite-horizon random matching model with a …nite number of players. In any
period a player either plays a prisoners’ dilemma game against one of a subset of possible
opponents or remains unmatched for that period. They study the incentives for players to
play cooperatively under di¤erent informational assumptions about a players knowledge
of the past play of their potential opponents. Goerlich (1996-97) looks at cooperative and
non-cooperative models of ceremonial gift exchange and barter. But none of these papers
address the insurance issue which is central to the explanations of gift-giving given by the
anthropological literature and is the main concern of the present paper.
There are also a number of other possible explanations for reciprocity and gift-giving.
It could be that the villagers are simply extremely moral and have a strong sense of
11The theory can be readily extended to incorporate additional costs of reneging on an arrangement such
as shame, social sanctions, etc. The inclusion of such costs would however a¤ect the exercise conducted in
Sections 6 and 7.
12The general approach that agents will balance current loss against expected future gains will apply
to any trading relation and is not speci…c to mutual insurance. Thus, e.g., borrowing to make productive
investments which payo¤ in the future could be treated in a similar way. Other, non-economic transactions
are also, in principle, amenable to this approach.
13See also Schwatz (1967).
14See also Nettle and Dunbar (1997).
6social justice which involves raising the incomes of the poor. This is the view of Scott
(1976) who stresses that ”the obligation of reciprocity is a moral principle par excellence”.
For Scott the village notion of social justice includes the right to a subsistence level of
income and the village is seen as the institution which guarantees this subsistence income
through a system of reciprocities. Popkin (1979) and Popkin (1980) has severely criticized
Scott and what he calls the moral economists. He questions whether a peasant society
is any more moral than any other society and cites evidence of sel…sh behavior (see also
Foster, 1965). He asks how these norms of reciprocities are derived, how subsistence is
de…ned and how needs are assessed. One important criticism concerns the “safety-…rst”
principle emphasized by the moral economists. The “safety-…rst” principle argues that
villagers should and do avoid risk at all costs. Popkin argues that if villagers were so
moral that they bailed-out anyone who fell below subsistence this would not be necessary.
A related possibility is that transfers are made for altruistic reasons. That is, the gift
contributes to the giver’s utility. It is well recognized that many transfers are between
family and friends, the F-connection as Ben-Porath (1980) has called it. A number of
authors have attempted to consider the role of altruism (see, e.g., Ravallion and Dearden,
1988; Foster and Rosenzweig, 1995; Rosenzweig, 1988; Stark, 1995). However, we feel that
altruism cannot provide a complete explanation as altruism by itself cannot explain the
use of loans rather than gifts alone, that is, balanced rather than generalized reciprocity,
which seems a general feature of the evidence cited above.
In a similar vein, a recent game-theoretic literature takes reciprocity as a fundamen-
tal behavioral axiom, and either tests this axiom in laboratory experiments or explores
its consequences (Fehr and Tyran, 1997; Falk and Fischbacher, 1998). Ru­e (1999) has
applied psychological game theory (where beliefs enter directly into a player’s payo¤ func-
tion) to gift giving; see also Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998). This work, however,
does not concern itself with the speci…c question of informal insurance. In contrast with
these models which assume either that people are altruistic or motivated to reciprocate,
our work makes no such assumption, but derives reciprocal behavior as an implication.
Of course, these two approaches need not necessarily be in con‡ict. If reciprocating is in
an individual’s self interest, then there may be an argument to suggest that a reciprocity
norm might well evolve.
Other explanations have been o¤ered in terms of social exchange or tolerated theft.
The social exchange theorists (for an exposition, see, e.g., Heath, 1976) hypothesize that
the act of giving creates a counter exchange in terms of an intangible like respect or prestige
or status or avoidance of guilt. Blurton-Jones (1984) has also suggested that food-sharing
is a form of tolerated theft: if the gifts were not given they would be stolen anyway. These
however, can be criticized as giving no predictions about the size or nature of the gifts,
n o rc a nt h e ye a s i l ye x p l a i nt h eu s eo fl o a n si n s t e a do fg i f t s .
74 Examples and a result on quasi-credit
As an example of our approach consider the following. Suppose there are two households.
Each has an income of either 1000 with probability (1¡p) or 500 with probability p.T h e s e
draws are independent so the probability that both households get 500, for example, is p2.
Now consider a pure gift scheme where, if the incomes are di¤erent, the household with the
high income gives an amount x, 250 ¸ x ¸ 0, to the low income household. We can ask
whether it is in the household’s interest to make such a gift of the amount x given that it
expects the other household to reciprocate. Suppose that within each period, a household’s
welfare or utility depends only upon consumption during that period. Speci…cally, suppose
that each household (treated as a monolithic entity) has a utility of consumption function
u(c), where c is consumption, which has positive but diminishing marginal utility, so that
u0(c) > 0 and u00(c) < 0 (where primes denote derivatives). Positive marginal utility
simply means that the household prefers more to less. Diminishing marginal utility has
the interpretation that the household is averse to risk (in the expected utility framework
that we shall utilize). The short-run utility cost to making the transfer is
u(1000) ¡ u(1000 ¡ x):
Now suppose that both households live for an in…nite number of periods (to justify this,
consider them as dynasties), t =1 ;2;:::; but that each unit of utility next period is
worth only ±<1 of a unit of today’s utility (i.e., ± is the “discount factor”, with higher
values corresponding to increasing patience). Then total household utility is given by the
discounted sum
P1
t=1 ±t¡1u(ct) where ct is consumption in period t. Where consumption
streams are uncertain, the expected value of the discounted sum is taken, in accordance
with expected utility theory. Assuming that the process determining income is the same
each period and does not depend on past realizations of income, then the potential long-
term gain from such an arrangement is
±
(1 ¡ ±)
fp(1 ¡ p)(u(500 + x) ¡ u(500))g¡
±
(1 ¡ ±)
fp(1 ¡ p)(u(1000 ¡ x) ¡ u(1000))g
where u(500+x)¡u(500)) is the gain in any period when the household receives a transfer,
while u(1000) ¡ u(1000 ¡ x)) is the loss when a transfer is made to the other household.
Since marginal utility is diminishing the utility gain from being a recipient exceeds the
utility loss from being a giver,
u(500 + x) ¡ u(500) >u (1000 ¡ x) ¡ u(1000)
and so the long-term gain in the equation above is positive. This simply re‡ects the fact
that there are gains to risk-pooling. They will be larger the greater the curvature of the
utility function—the more risk averse are the households. The long-term gains are also
increasing in x (provided x<250)a n d±. The short-term loss is increasing in x.
8Harvest 1’s yield 2’s yield Transfer 1 to 2 1’s share 2’s share
418 1000 1000 0 0.5 0.5
419 1000 500 177.1 0.5486 0.4514
420 1000 1000 0 0.5 0.5
421 1000 500 177.1 0.5486 0.4514
422 1000 1000 0 0.5 0.5
423 1000 1000 0 0.5 0.5
424 500 1000 -177.1 0.5486 0.4514
425 500 500 0 0.5 0.5
426 1000 500 171.1 0.5486 0.4514
427 1000 1000 0 0.5 0.5
Table 1: Static Transfer
Ideally the outcome should be x =2 5 0where each household gets an equal share
of aggregate income. This would mean full or “perfect” insurance with each household’s
share of aggregate income unchanging. (Note that perfect insurance doesn’t entail all
consumption variability being eliminated—in a small community this is impossible—but it
means that risks should be shared appropriately between the members of the community;
see Section 5.2.) Depending on the probabilities and the discount factor, however, the
perfect insurance transfer/gift of 250 may not be sustainable as the short-term loss will
exceed any long-term bene…ts. In other words, if the assumption is made that a household
will participate in the arrangement only so long as it perceives a bene…t from so doing,
it may not pay a household to make a transfer as large as 250. As an example, suppose
±=20/21 which corresponds to a discount rate of 5%, p =0 :1, and that the utility function
is logarithmic. Then the short-run loss is 0.2877 and the long-term gain is 0.2120. Thus it
is not worthwhile making a transfer of 250. It may be worthwhile if x were smaller and a
simple calculation shows that the long-term gains o¤set the short -term losses for x<177.1.
The maximum risk-pooling that can be achieved given that the long-term bene…ts should
exceed any short-term costs is x=177.1. This solution is what we shall call the pure gift
solution and is that outlined in the paper by Coate and Ravallion (1993). It is a static
solution because if the distribution of income is the same, then the same transfers or gifts
are made. The results of a particular simulation is shown for a few periods in Table 1. The
absence of commitment to a relationship (in, for example, a legal framework) implies that
the relative shares of aggregate income are no longer constant over time as they would be
with perfect insurance.
N o t et h a tt h eg i v i n go fag i f t( m a k i n go fat r a n s f e r )i nt h i ss o l u t i o nd o e sn o tc r e a t e
a counter obligation beyond what already exists. Provided the gifts are large enough,
such generalized reciprocity can achieve perfect insurance, so it is potentially the best
arrangement. But, as argued above, if households participate only so long as it is in their
interests to do so, then large gifts may not be sustainable. It is then not obvious that
generalized reciprocity is the best arrangement.
9Harvest 1’s yield 2’s yield Transfer 1 to 2 1’s share 2’s share
418 1000 1000 -16.59 0.5083 0.4917
419 1000 500 237.56 0.4917 0.5083
420 1000 1000 -16.59 0.5083 0.4917
421 1000 500 237.56 0.4917 0.508
422 1000 1000 -16.59 0.5083 0.4917
423 1000 1000 -16.59 0.5083 0.4917
424 500 1000 -237.56 0.5083 0.4917
425 500 500 8.29 0.4917 0.5083
426 1000 500 237.56 0.4917 0.5083
427 1000 1000 16.59 0.4917 0.5083
Table 2: Dynamic Transfers
As already stated the evidence suggests widespread use of quasi-credit as a means of
informal insurance. In the context of limited commitment the bene…ts of the quasi-credit
element becomes clear. Start from a pure gift arrangement with x<250 but also x>0
(that is, positive, but less than perfect insurance, as explained above), and assume that
this is sustainable, that is, so it is in the donor’s long-term interests to make the transfer x.
Suppose that the transfer is increased by a small amount, say ¢ units, and in return there
is a payment of R¢ next period if both households have 1000 (but not otherwise), so R is
the gross interest rate, with the debt being written o¤ if either household (or both) receives
a low income. That is to say, add a small amount of quasi-credit to a system of gifts. The
current marginal gain to the transferee is, using a …rst-order approximation, u0(500+x)¢¢
and the expected marginal loss from next period’s repayment is ±(1 ¡ p)2u0(1000) ¢ R¢
where (1¡p)2 is the probability that both households have an income of 1000 so that the
repayment is called for. The current marginal loss to the transferer is u0(1000¡x)¢¢ and
the expected marginal gain from next period’s repayment is ±(1 ¡ p)2u0(1000)R ¢ ¢,t h e
same as the transferee’s loss. As marginal utility is diminishing, u0(1000¡x) <u 0(500+x)
for x<250,s oi ti sp o s s i b l et oc h o o s eR in such a way that both transferer and transferee







Moreover, provided ¢ is chosen small enough, the borrower will choose to repay when
called upon to do so, because the cost of doing so, ±(1¡p)2u0(1000) ¢R¢, is proportional
to ¢, while the cost of not doing so is the loss of future insurance, which is at least the value
of insurance under the pure gift scheme x, and hence bounded below by a …xed positive
number.15 This argument works even when x is such that, in the pure gift scheme, the
transferer is on the margin of not making the transfer, that is, indi¤erent. The intuition
is simple. By demanding a repayment the transferer has an incentive to make a larger
15The argument does not imply that ¢ is necessarily small, only that a small enough ¢ is guaranteed
to work. See Section 6 for illustrations of the optimal magnitude of loans.
10Figure 1: Relative Shares - Gifts Only
transfer and this helps risk-pooling which is to everyone’s bene…t. The cost of this is a
move away from an equal share when both receive 1000—extra variability is introduced—
but this cost is very small (formally, second-order) relative to the extra insurance when
one household’s income is 500 (which is …rst-order).
The above demonstrates that whenever the pure gift solution is unable to deliver
perfect insurance (i.e., whenever x<250), there is a superior arrangement involving some
counter obligation. Moreover the argument just given does not depend on the speci…cs of
the income distribution (it generalizes to arbitrary …nite distributions). Exactly how the
loans and repayments are optimally arranged is discussed later but the optimal solution—
what we call the “dynamic limited commitment solution”— in the example with logarith-
mic utility and ±=20/21 and p =0 :1 is illustrated in Table 2. This solution is analysed
more explicitly in Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (1997). It can be seen from the table that
the shares of income are less variable than in Table 1, so that more insurance is being
provided. It should be stressed that this is the best conceivable arrangement given the
constraint of voluntary participation, and in the remainder of the paper we shall investi-
gate the extent to which a simple implementation of counter obligation using interest-free
quasi credit measures up to this potentially complex ideal. Nevertheless, even in the best
arrangement, the element of counter obligation can be clearly seen. For example in period
421, household 1 makes a large insurance transfer to 2 who has received a low yield; in the
following two periods, yields return to parity, but 2 makes a small transfer to 1 (of 16.59).
It is the anticipation of this “repayment” which helps to persuade 1 to make such a large
initial transfer.
The variability in the shares indicate the extent of the insurance so it is worthwhile
11considering a slightly more complicated example to illustrate how shares change over
time.16 A random sample of nine incomes was drawn from a lognormal distribution with
a mean and variance matching that in the data from the villages in rural India discussed
below. It was assumed that the two households have identical and independent income
draws, so there are a total of 81 states. The solutions were computed and income simulated
over 600 periods. The results for 50 periods are displayed in Figure 1 and Figure 2. The
vertical axis plots the logarithm of the relative shares of aggregate income of the two
households. Thus a value of 0 represents equal shares (i.e., equal consumption levels) and
positive values indicate that household 1 has the larger share. The middle line indicates
the actual shares in an insurance arrangement and the top and bottom lines indicate the
theoretical limits. These theoretical limits indicate optimal u p p e ra n dl o w e rb o u n d sf o r
t h es h a r e s .I nt h ep u r eg i f tc a s e( F i g u r e1 )t h em i d d l el i n er e t u r n st ot h eh o r i z o n t a la x i s
when possible but is otherwise at one of its bounds. In the dynamic limited commitment
case (Figure 2) two things are di¤erent. The theoretical bounds are smaller and the middle
line does not revert to the horizontal axis but stays constant between the bounds if it can.
Looking at Figure 2, it is easy to see the general rule for the relative shares: keep the
relative share constant if doing so keeps it within the theoretical bounds, otherwise move
it by the smallest possible amount to keep it within the theoretical bounds. The bounds
themselves move in accordance with the income distribution: so if household 1, say, has
a higher income than household 2, in the absence of a transfer it would receive a higher
share (it just consumes its income); it may not be desirable to push the share down to one
half as household 1 would not be prepared to sacri…ce so much. Thus the lower bound
on the logarithm of the relative share may be above 0. These upper and lower bounds
depend only on the current income distribution. We will see how this rule is derived from
a dynamic programming problem the Appendix.
5C a l i b r a t i n g a m o d e l
In order to gauge whether this approach can help explain the type of arrangements that are
observed, we adopt the following approach. First, an attempt is made to get an estimate
of likely parameter values for the sort of simple example already considered. The extent
and nature of the informal insurance will depend on three things: individuals’ attitudes
towards risk, the nature of the risk facing a community and the discount factor which
measures how future income is treated relative to present income. Much of the evidence is
based on detailed surveys conducted by the International Crop Research Institute for the
Semi-Arid Tropics (ICRISAT). Using these estimates, we investigate how a stylized version
of observed arrangements performs, in terms of the amount of insurance it can provide,
relative to both the pure gift and the dynamic limited commitment solution (outlined in
16Details of the computation and simulation procedure can be found in the Appendix; the utility function
and discount factor are as before.
12Figure 2: Relative Shares - Dynamic Limited Commitment
the Appendix). We have already seen that adding a small amount of credit or reciprocity
to a pure gift (i.e., static) arrangement can lead to more insurance. On the other hand,
the dynamic limited commitment solution gives an upper bound on what can be achieved.
If the stylized arrangement performs signi…cantly better than the pure gift solution, going
some way towards the dynamic solution, then this can be taken as evidence that the
approach taken here can explain key features of such arrangements. The dynamic limited
commitment model itself has been tested against household data by Ligon, Thomas, and
Worrall (1997), with generally positive results, and the current study should be viewed as
complementary to this paper.
5.1 Attitudes towards risk
Attitudes towards risk are important because they determine the cost to an individual of
variation in income and hence the value of insurance. The cost of the variation in income
can be measured by the proportional risk premium. It measures the proportion of average
income an individual would be prepared to give up to obtain a stable income level. It is





where ½ is the proportional risk premium, R = ¡cu00(c)=u0(c) is the “Arrow-Pratt” coe¢-
cient of relative risk aversion and v is the coe¢cient of variation, the standard deviation
divided by the mean.
Thus to know the cost of the risk, an estimate of the coe¢cient of risk aversion is
13Choice Heads Tails Exp Value
15 5 5
29 . 5 4 . 5 7
31 2 4 8
41 6 2 9
51 9 1 1 0
62 0 0 1 0
T a b l e3 :B i n s w a n g e r ’ sE x p e r i m e n t :T h ea m o u n t sa r ei nR s
needed. Binswanger (1980) and Binswanger (1981) conducted a series of experiments to
try to gauge risk aversion amongst the households in the ICRISAT survey. He o¤ered
a series of gambles where players were invited to choose one of the alternative gambles
outlined in Table 3. This was done repeatedly and with four di¤erent amounts of money
(in Rupees): the amounts in Table 3 were also divided by a factor of 10 and multiplied
by factors of 10 and 100. The …rst three of these games were played for real money; the
other game (where gamble 1 was a sure gain of 500Rs, etc.) was hypothetical. Someone
who consistently chooses gamble 1 is extremely risk averse and is prepared to give up a
l a r g ee x p e c t e dr e t u r nf o rt h es a f e t yo fac e r t a i ng a i n .S o m e o n ew h oc o n s i s t e n t l yc h o o s e s
g a m b l e s5o r6i sr i s kn e u t r a la n da l w a y sg o e sf o rt h eh i g h e s te x p e c t e dr e t u r n sn om a t t e r
what the risk. The modal choice was 3 or 4 indicating a moderate but not extreme risk
aversion. It corresponds to a coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of around 2. This means
that a household which faces a coe¢cient of variation of income is 0.4 and has a coe¢cient
of relative risk aversion of 2, would be prepared to pay 16% of its wealth in order to
stabilize its income.
Statistical evidence from Antle (1987) also seems to support these results and evidence
presented in Walker and Ryan (1990) also …nds that using the experimental results on risk
aversion helped explain actual choices of savings and investment in irrigation. That is, the
more risk averse players adopted more cautious strategies for investment decisions.
5.2 Risk
As already stated, risk is perhaps the most dominant factor of life in subsistence economies.
In the ICRISAT data the coe¢cient of variation of income ranged from 10% to 80% with
the majority falling in the 20% – 40% range. Thirty-two of the 108 households surveyed
in three of the ICRISAT villages Aurepalle, Kanzara and Shirapur, su¤ered one or more
years where income was 50% or more below the median income. In the Indian …shing
villages of Purakkad (mentioned above) and Poovar the coe¢cient of variation was even
higher at over 100% (Platteau, 1997).
As we have seen a household which faces a coe¢cient of variation of 0.4 and has a
coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of 2 is prepared to pay 16% of its wealth in order to
14stabilize this income. The question is whether there is anyone in the village who would be
prepared to buy this risk. There are two possibilities: risk-sharing and risk-pooling.
A risk shared is a risk halved. Consider the following simple example with two
households both with a constant coe¢cient of relative risk aversion of 2. One has a risky
income of either 60 or 140 with equal probability (this gives an expected value of 100
and a coe¢cient of variation of 0.4). The other has a sure income of 100. Household 1
is prepared to pay 16 to eliminate its risk. Suppose however the two households share
their income 50:50 so each gets either 80 or 120 with equal probability. The coe¢cient of
variation is 0.2 for each so each would be prepared to pay 4 to eliminate the risk. The
total cost of the risk is now 8 rather than 16, so the cost of the risk has been halved. It is
also clear that there is a potential trade here. Household 1 would be prepared to pay 12
to reduce the variation from 0.4 to 0.2 and household 2 is willing to accept 4 to take on
the extra risk, i.e. increase its variation from 0 to 0.2. Thus a situation where household
2 accepts a premium of say 8 and agrees to share the risk 50:50 should be bene…cial to
both.
Of course there may be no one in the village who does not face risk so it is important
to know if it is still possible to trade risk when all face risks. This is known as risk
pooling. The extent to which this is possible depends on how covariate are the risks. For
example if household 2 also has an uncertain yield of 60 and 140 but when household 1
had 60 household 2 has 140 then the two risks are perfectly negatively correlated and by
sharing 50:50 they could perfectly stabilize their incomes. If on the other hand the risks
were perfectly positively correlated, then no sharing can reduce the risks. An informal
insurance arrangement can only work if incomes are not perfectly correlated. The degree
to which risks can be reduced will depend on the covariance or correlation between the
risks.
The evidence suggest that the covariances are, perhaps surprisingly, very low. The
covariances in the …shing villages of Poovar and Purakkad were very close to zero (see
Platteau (1997)). In the ICRISAT villages the correlations with average village income
were on average around 0.2 but varied from -0.7 to 0.9 (see Townsend (1994)). Thus there
seems to be great scope for risk-pooling. In our calibrated model, we shall assume that
the covariances are zero.
5.3 The discount rate
The rate at which villagers discount the future is also important. If they completely
discounted the future (± =0 ) , then there would be no reason to make gifts or loans as the
future reciprocation would not be valued. At the other extreme, if they were very patient
(± ¼ 1); then the best (pure gift) arrangement would be sustainable as any short-run cost
from sacri…cing current resources would always be outweighed by the long-term bene…ts
15Choice September 1990 September 1991 Implied Discount Rate
11 0 K g 9 K g - 1 0 %
21 0 K g 1 0 K g 0 %
31 0 K g 1 1 K g 1 0 %
41 0 K g 1 2 K g 2 0 %
51 0 K g 1 3 K g 3 0 %
61 0 K g 1 5 K g 5 0 %
71 0 K g 1 7 K g 7 0 %
81 0 K g 2 0 K g 1 0 0 %
Table 4: Pender’s Experiment
of insurance.
Pender (1996) conducted a series of experiments to …nd out the discount rate amongst
villagers in Aurepalle (one of the ICRISAT villages). Like the experiments of Binswanger,
these were real rather than hypothetical experiments. Respondents were asked to state
their preference over a series of choices between quantities of rice and the date they would
be received like those in Table 4. The rightmost column shows the implied discount
rate if the respondent was indi¤erent between the two alternatives. Thus if a respondent
picked September 1990 (now) in choices 1–4 but September 1991 in choices 5–8, then the
discount rate would be in the range 20%–30%. Each respondent answered three similar
sets of choices with di¤erent base amounts and then one choice was randomly assigned as
a reward. Thus if the respondent chose September 1991 in choice 8 in Table 4 and this
was the choice assigned to him, then he would receive 20 Kg of rice in September 1991.
There were two key features of the results. The discount rates were highly variable and
the average rate was extremely high compared to the results from similar experiments
conducted in industrialized societies. The median discount rate was above 50% implying
that most respondents would prefer to have 10 Kg now rather than 15 Kg in one years
time.
It is important to note that these experiments are designed to …nd the intertemporal
marginal rate of substitution. That is how one person values consumption now against
consumption in the future. In fact the discount rate that is needed for calibrating the
model is t h er a t eo fp u r et i m ep r e f e r e n c e : that is, how a person values extra utility now
against extra utility in the future, or equivalently how a person values extra consumption
now against extra consumption in the future with consumption the same in both periods.
If, however, average consumption is approximately constant and if marginal utility is a
convex function of income (u000(c) ¸ 0; which is true of the logarithmic utility function),
then Pender’s estimates provide a lower bound for the rate of pure time preference. This
implies an upper bound for the discount factor, which is one over one plus the rate of pure
time preference, of about two-thirds.
166G i f t s a n d L o a n s
In this section we ask whether a scheme of gifts and loans can come close to achieving what
can be achieved by the dynamic limited commitment solution. We use estimates for the
discount factor, coe¢cient of variation and coe¢cient of risk aversion in the range discussed
in the previous section. This is vital for the theory which we are proposing: for some
parameter values the theory gives trivial answers. For example, holding the coe¢cient
of variation and coe¢cient of risk aversion constant, if households are very impatient (±
near zero), putting little weight on the future, it turns out that no risk-pooling is possible
because the (heavily discounted) future gains from insurance will never outweigh the loss
from sacri…cing current resources today. Similarly, if they are very patient (± near 1)
the future gains will always be so large relative to current losses that perfect insurance is
possible, and consequently gifts alone are used in the gift/loan arrangement (which is then
identical to the dynamic limited commitment solution), and there would be no balanced
reciprocity.
The model is a general version of the example outlined in Section 4. There are two
identical households who have an income of y and a probability p of a loss of size d.T h e
risks are independent and hence the coe¢cient of variation is
v =
p
(p(y ¡ d ¡ m)2 +( 1¡ p)(y ¡ m)2)
m
where m = p(y ¡ d)+( 1¡ p)y is average income. The gift/loan scheme we consider is as
follows. When one household su¤ers a loss, the other gives it a gift of G and makes an
interest-free loan of L. As we have seen in section 4 the addition of an interest-free loan can
lead to improvements in risk sharing. Next period, if neither su¤ers a loss then the loan
L is repaid. If the same household receives a loss the gift and loan are repeated (i.e., in
this case the loan is written o¤). If both households su¤er a loss then the loan repayment
is reduced to L0 in such a way that the loan repayment is reduced proportionally to the
reduction in income (so that the loan is e¤ectively written down; in the example of section





If the other household su¤ers a loss then he receives the gift of G and loan of L and the
previous loan is forgotten. This scheme has the virtue of being very simple and accords
well with the evidence presented above that gifts and interest-free loans are both used and
that sometimes loans are forgiven if circumstances dictate.
To see how this scheme works, consider the case where there are no loans outstanding.
There are four possible situations. Both su¤er no loss, which we label nn; both su¤er a loss,
which we label ll; or one su¤ers a loss and the other does not, which are labelled nl and ln.
Let V denote the surplus over autarky (i.e., the di¤erence between expected discounted
utility under the scheme and under autarky) before the yields are known and let Vnn
17denote the surplus when neither su¤ers a loss, Vnl denote the surplus of a household when
only the other household su¤ers a loss, etc., assuming that there are no loans outstanding
from the previous period. Then
V =( 1¡ p)2Vnn + p2Vll + p(1 ¡ p)Vnl +( 1¡ p)pVln:
Since no payments are made in the situations where neither or both su¤er a loss, then




If the second household su¤ers a loss, then he receives a gift of G and loan of L and so
the surplus for the …rst household is
Vnl = u(y ¡ G ¡ L) ¡ u(y)
+ ±(1 ¡ p)2(u(y + L) ¡ u(y)+±V)
+ ±p2(u(y ¡ d + L0) ¡ u(y ¡ d)+±V)
+ ±p(1 ¡ p)Vnl + ±(1 ¡ p)pVln:
The …rst line is the loss in utility of giving G and loaning L; the second line is the discounted
gain if neither su¤ers a loss so L is repaid and we start again from the situation of no
outstanding loan; the third line is likewise the discounted gain from the loan repayment of
L0 if both su¤er a loss and starting again from no outstanding loan; and the last line is the
discounted surplus in states nl and ln,w h e r eVln is calculated similarly by the equation
Vln = u(y ¡ d + G + L) ¡ u(y ¡ d)
+ ±(1 ¡ p)2(u(y ¡ L) ¡ u(y)+±V)
+ ±p2(u(y ¡ d ¡ L0) ¡ u(y ¡ d)+±V)
+ ±p(1 ¡ p)Vnl + ±(1 ¡ p)pVln:




Vnl = Y + ±V =
(1 ¡ ±®)Y + ±®Z
1 ¡ 2±®
Vln = Z + ±V =





1 ¡ ±(1 ¡ 2p(1 ¡ p))
18Y = u(y ¡ G ¡ L) ¡ u(y)
+±(1 ¡ p)2(u(y + L) ¡ u(y)) + ±p2(u(y ¡ d + L0) ¡ u(y ¡ d))
Z = u(y ¡ d + G + L) ¡ u(y ¡ d)
+±(1 ¡ p)2(u(y ¡ L) ¡ u(y)) + ±p2(u(y ¡ d ¡ L0) ¡ u(y ¡ d)):
The objective is to choose G and L so as to maximize V . However, the household must
always have an incentive to provide the gift and loan, so
Vnl = Y + ±V ¸ 0 (1)
and must have an incentive to repay the loan17
u(y ¡ L) ¡ u(y)+±V ¸ 0: (2)
Given the estimates of Section 5, we choose y =1 0 0(for illustrative purposes; none of
the comparisons depend on the level) and take as a base case the following values for
the parameters: coe¢cient of variation v =0 :45 and the discount factor ± =0 :65; the
coe¢cient of relative risk aversion is R =2and we use the constant relative risk-aversion
utility function u(c)=c1¡R=(1 ¡ R) (or logc for R =1 ). These parameter values are
…rmly in the middle of the ranges given in the last section.18 With a coe¢cient of variation
v =0 :45 and a probability of loss p =0 :5 the implied loss is d =$62:07.19 While it is
not possible to obtain an analytical solution for the optimum gift and loan, it is possible
to do so numerically. It is clear that either (1) or (2) holds as an equality unless perfect
insurance is possible. Thus by gridding over 100 values for L and choosing the values of
G which satisfy the constraints, it is then possible to …nd the combination of G and L
which attains the highest value for V and simultaneously satisfy both constraints. The
optimum is G =$21:01 and L =$5:90.20 Thus when one household su¤ers a loss its income
is y¡d+G+L =$64:84 and the other’s net income is y¡G¡L =$73:09. The repayment
next period is either $5:90 if neither su¤ers a loss and $2:24 if both su¤er a loss.
As a contrast we consider a situation of generalized reciprocity where only gifts are
used and a system of pure credit where only interest-free loans are used. In the system of
generalized reciprocity, the optimal gift is $24:87 and in the case of pure credit, the optimal
loan is $1:06 with a repayment of $0:41 if both households su¤er a loss. We see that gifts
alone do quite well but gifts and loans together provide a distinct improvement. Loans by
themselves prove to be inadequate. The reason is that the loan payment improves risk-
sharing but the loan repayment harms risk-sharing. The purpose of the loan repayment is
17For R>1, u(y ¡L)¡u(y) >u (y ¡d¡L




(1¡R) ¡ (y ¡ d)
(1¡R))=(1 ¡ R) ¸ 0.
18We have presumed that the covariance is zero.
19A value for the coe¢cient of variation and for y does not …x the distribution even if it is assumed to
be two point, as here. Nevertheless simulations suggest that our result are not particularly sensitive to the
w a yt h a tt h i si sb r o k e nu pi n t op and d.
20A Mathematica package is available from the authors.
19to encourage risk-sharing when incomes are di¤erent. But with loans alone, this is di¢cult
and the loan cannot be raised much without running into the constraint (2). The reason
that a higher value for L is possible in the combined gift/loan scheme is that the gift
element allows much more insurance, so that higher loan repayments are sustainable due
to the fact that there is more to lose, in terms of future insurance, if a repayment is not
made.
A better comparison can be made by calculating the surpluses—the increase in utility
over autarky—from each scheme. We do this relative to the most e¢cient (i.e., the dynamic
limited commitment) scheme. The most e¢cient scheme involves more complicated gifts
and loans and repayments over more than one period. The procedure for calculating
the e¢cient contract is outlined in the Appendix. The purpose here is to show that a
simple system of gifts and loans can do extremely well and do almost as well as the more
complicated contract. The gift/loan scheme achieves 99:62% of the total possible surplus
from the most e¢cient scheme. The generalized reciprocity scheme of gifts scores 98:40%
and the pure credit scheme of loans only scores 8:37%. Thus some loan element is bene…cial
when combined with gifts, although for these parameter values only mildly so. In the next
section it is shown that for parameter values close to these ones, the loan element can be
much more valuable.
7S e n s i t i v i t y
In this section we examine how sensitive the estimates are to the parameter values. We …rst
consider how gifts and loans in the combined gift/loan arrangement respond to di¤erent
parameter values around the base case given in Section 6 with income in the no loss state
y =1 0 0 , the coe¢cient of risk aversion R =2 , the discount factor ± =0 :65 and the
coe¢cient of variation v =0 :45. This is shown in Figure 7 for the three parameters; the
coe¢cient of risk aversion; the discount factor and the coe¢cient of variation. We take
the parameters to range within the values suggested in Section 5.
Thus the …rst panel shows values for the coe¢cient of risk aversion between 1 and 2.5
with the discount factor …xed at ± =0 :65 and the coe¢cient of variation …xed at v =0 :45.
As risk aversion increases, the (future) bene…ts from mutual insurance rise (relative to the
current cost of making a transfer to the other party), and this allows more insurance to
be provided. Thus, for a value of risk aversion close to one, no gift/loan combination is
sustainable; for slightly higher values of risk aversion, some insurance is possible and loans
are more important than gifts. Eventually as the coe¢cient of risk aversion increases,
gifts dominate loans, and for a value of the coe¢cient of risk aversion above 2.35 complete
insurance is possible and so no loan element is required. A similar picture obtains as the
other two parameter values are varied. The second panel shows how the gifts and loans
vary as the discount factor varies between 0.36 and 0.72 with the other parameters …xed at
20Figure 3: Gifts and Loans
their baseline values. At a discount factor of below 0.38, no insurance is possible and for a
discount factor above 0.72, complete insurance is possible. In between, gifts increase and
loans increase at …rst but become less important for higher discount factors. A similar
pattern emerges from the third panel which plots gifts and loans as the coe¢cient of
variation ranges between 0.1 and 0.8. For values of v above 0.55, full insurance is possible
and for values below 0.2, no insurance is possible. At low values of v, both gifts and loans
increase as v rises but eventually loans become less important.21The next …gure, Figure
4, plots the surpluses relative to the dynamic limited commitment surplus for the same
range of parameter values. The solid line is the percentage surplus from gifts and loans;
t h ed o t t e dl i n ef r o mg i f t sa l o n ea n dt h ed a s h e dl i n ef r o ml o a n sa l o n e .I ts h o w sh o ww e l l
each of these arrangements does. Since these surpluses are relative to the dynamic limited
commitment surplus, a value of 100% is the theoretical maximum for all parameter values.
As can be seen gifts easily dominates loans and gifts and loans together dominate either
(as we know from the result in Section 4). From the …rst panel it can be seen that for a low
value of the coe¢cient of risk aversion such as R =1 :1, the gift only arrangement attains
3% of the most possible whereas gifts and loans together achieve 91%. This dominance
is preserved although diminished as R rises until it is possible to obtain complete risk
sharing with gifts alone for R>2:35. The second and third panels show a similar story as
± and v are varied. From each case it appears that the combination of gifts and loans can
do considerably better than gifts alone provided that some but not complete insurance is
possible.
21Gifts continue to rise for v>0:55 as the loss of income in the bad state increases with v.
21Figure 4: Relative Surpluses
8C o n c l u s i o n
A key feature of the informal insurance arrangements in rural communities discussed in
the introduction is the use of gifts and informal loans which are uncollateralized and pay
no interest. There is a presumption that gifts will be reciprocated and loans repaid unless
adverse circumstances dictate otherwise. That is, mutual insurance takes the form of
balanced reciprocity or quasi-credit.
We have shown that quasi-credit arrangements can be the outcome of a dynamic
game when reciprocation is the voluntary action of rational agents rather than enforced.
If reciprocation were obligatory, gift-giving alone as need arises would be the best arrange-
ment. Quasi-credit is less e¤ective as if a household borrows in the face of an adverse shock
and then immediately su¤ers another adverse shock, it has repayment obligations on the
borrowing already made, and unless it is willing to accumulate even more debt, it will
be forced to cut consumption. Had it received a gift without counter obligation after the
…rst shock, it would be in no worse position after the second shock, and provided another
gift is made, it would be able to maintain its consumption. The problem with a pure gift
arrangement in this case is that the counter obligation may not be su¢cient to induce
the giver to part with resources today. On the other hand, if there is a credit element to
the transaction, the giver will expect some future reward—repayment on the loan—over
and above any reciprocal insurance promise, and this may provide su¢cient incentive to
induce the giver to part with resources today.
The exact nature of the quasi-credit arrangement depends upon a few key parameters.
22These are the size of the risk as measured by the coe¢cient of variation and the covariance
of household incomes; the degree to which households are a¤ected by risk as measured by
the coe¢cient of risk aversion; and the rate at which households discount future as mea-
sured by the rate of pure time preference. The ICRISAT data on villages in southern India
allows estimates for these parameters and we have calibrated the model using estimates
from this literature. Using this calibration, we are able compute the best quasi-credit ar-
rangements for some simple examples. In addition we are able to compare the outcome to
the optimum dynamic limited commitment outcomes which are discussed in the Appendix.
The latter arrangements are more complex because the loan repayments are spread over
many periods and depend upon the sequence of shocks. Nevertheless it is shown that for
a range of typical parameter values a very simple quasi-credit scheme does almost as well
as the more complex dynamic limited commitment arrangement. This suggest that the
advantage of the dynamic element can be adequately captured by a simple interest-free
loan element and that the quasi-credit arrangements used in practice are very close to op-
timum when reciprocity is voluntary. Thus not only is balanced reciprocity a theoretical
possibility in the model, for plausible parameter values, it can achieve something close the
best insurance that can be attained.
Is the approach to reciprocity outlined in this paper applicable outside of the context
of mutual insurance in rural communities? In principle, it is relevant to any situation in
which risk is important and the need for informal insurance arises. An obvious example is
within-family transfers even in economies where developed insurance markets, private or
public, exist. Such markets su¤er from a number of imperfections, especially because of the
di¢culties and cost of obtaining all relevant information, and thus there is a bene…t to be
had from insurance arrangements in the context where information ‡ows more freely (the
family) although participation cannot be enforced through legal means. Even outside of
an insurance context the analysis is potentially applicable, for example in any continuing
relation where each party can undertake costly actions, which may or may not involve
monetary transfers, that have a bene…t to the other party. Whenever these bene…ts
‡uctuate over time, either randomly or deterministically,22 so that party A today bene…ts
from an action taken by party B and there is a likelihood in the future that party B
will bene…t from an action taken by party A at that time, then the principle of balanced
reciprocity can be used to help sustain higher levels of mutual cooperation.
9A p p e n d i x
The Appendix outlines a general model with H households and shows how the optimum
risk-pooling arrangement under dynamic limited commitment can be derived and solution
numerically computed. It provides an upper bound to how well a simple arrangement of
gifts and loans can do. This problem is similar in structure to that analyzed by Thomas
and Worrall (1988), and we borrow heavily from that analysis and from Hayashi (1996).
Each period t =1 ;2;::: ,h o u s e h o l di (i =1 ;2;:::;H) receives an income yi(s) > 0
22The model developed in the Appendix is general enough to cover deterministic ‡uctuations.
23of a single perishable good, where s is the state of nature drawn from a …nite set s 2 S,
and S = f1;2;:::;Sg.T h es t a t ei sas u ¢ c i e n ts t a t i s t i cf o rt h ei n c o m ed i s t r i b u t i o na ta n y
particular date. It is assumed that the state of nature follows a Markov process with the
probability of transition from state s to state r given by ¼sr. This formalization includes as
a special case an identical and independent distribution over the possible states of nature
(¼sr is independent of s). The general speci…cation of the dependence of incomes yi(s) on
the state of nature allows for arbitrary correlation between the two incomes, although in the
simulations we have assumed that incomes are independently and identically distributed.
Household i has a per-period (“von-Neumann-Morgernstern”) utility of consump-
tion function ui(ci) which displays positive but diminishing marginal utility: u0
i(ci) > 0;
u00
i (ci) < 0: Households are in…nitely lived, discount the future with common discount
factor ±, and are expected utility maximizers. We assume that at date 0; before any un-
certainty is resolved, the households enter into an implicit risk-sharing arrangement. After
an arrangement violation by any party (failure to make a transfer to another household
when one is supposed to), all households consume at autarky levels (i.e., consume their
own income) thereafter.
What we refer to below as sustainable arrangements can be shown to correspond
precisely to the non-cooperative subgame-perfect equilibrium outcomes of the dynamic
game; since reversion to autarky is the most severe subgame-perfect punishment, not only
does a sustainable arrangement correspond to a subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome, but
also there can be no other equilibrium outcomes other than those characterized by using
reversion to autarky as a punishment.23
Let st be the state of the world occurring at date t. An arrangement will specify for
every date t and for each history of states up to and including date t, ht =( s1;s 2;:::;st),
a consumption level ci(ht).D e … n eUi(ht) to be the expected discounted utility gain over
autarky or surplus of household i from the arrangement from period t onwards, discounted
to period t,i fh i s t o r yht =( ht¡1;s t) occurs up to period t:
Ui(ht)=( 1¡ ±)(ui(ci(ht)) ¡ ui(yi(st))) + E
1 X
j=t+1
(1 ¡ ±)±j¡t(ui(ci(hj)) ¡ ui(yi(sj)));
where E denotes expectation, conditional on ht; and per-period utility has been normalized
by multiplying by (1 ¡ ±). The …rst term in the above equation is the short run gain
from the arrangement and the second term is the long-run or continuation gain from the
arrangement. This equation can be de…ned recursively as




Household i will have no incentive to break the arrangement if the following sustainability
constraint holds at each date t after every history ht:
Ui(ht) ¸ 0:
If these equations hold for all i =1 ;:::;H, then we call the arrangement sustainable.
23The argument is simply that any equilibrium outcome supported by a less severe credible punishment,
can also be supported by the more severe punishment considered here.
24A sustainable arrangement is e¢cient if there is no other sustainable arrangement
which Pareto dominates it. In the space of discounted utilities, the Pareto frontier is set
of utilities corresponding to e¢cient arrangements. The Pareto frontier at any date t and
given the current state s depends only on s and not on the past history which led to this
state. This allows us to simplify and abuse notation slightly by letting Ui
r denote the
continuation utility of household i when the state is r. Also let the Pareto frontier in state
r be de…ned implicitly by the function Tr(U1
r;:::;UH
r )=0 . Similar arguments to those
given in Thomas and Worrall (1988) show that the set de…ned by 0 ¸ Tr(U1
r;:::;UH
r ) is
a convex set (i.e., all points lying on a straight line between any two points in the set also
lie in the set).
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s ¸ 0 8i =1 ;:::;H
where wi is the “Pareto-weight” and Ys =
PH
i=1 yi
s is aggregate income in state s.F o l l o w i n g
Hayashi (1996) this problem can be decomposed into a number of sub-problems. The …rst











s = Ys and ci
s ¸ 0 8i =1 ;:::;H:















where Ãi is the “Lagrange” multiplier on the non-negativity constraint for household i
consumption. We can write the solution as ci(w;Ys) where w =( w1;:::;w H) is the vector
of Pareto-weights and an “indirect utility function” as vi(w;Ys)=ui(ci(w;Ys)).








r s:t: 0 ¸ Tr(U1
r;:::;UH
r ) and Ui
r ¸ 0 i =1 ;:::;H:












r is the multiplier on the sustainability constraint for household i.I t i s c l e a r
as argued above that the solution involves Tr(U1
r;:::;UH
r )=0 , so that the continuation
arrangement is itself e¢cient. Consider then the Pareto problem without the sustainability








r s:t: 0 ¸ Tr(U1
r;:::;UH
r ):









Denote the solution V i(~ w;r)=Ui
r(~ w) f o re a c hh o u s e h o l di, as the conditional household
value function (conditional on the state). These value functions map Pareto-weights to
continuation utilities in a Pareto-e¢cient way. They obey the simple recursive relationship











wiV i(~ w;r) s:t: V i(~ w;r) ¸ Ui
r 8i =1 ;:::;H;
where the value functions are used so that the next period Pareto-weights ~ w become the
maximand instead of the continuation utilities. It is clear from di¤erentiating the …rst-






=0 8k =1 ;:::;H;
so that in the absence of the sustainability constraint, the solution is ~ w = w and the
Pareto-weights change only in response to binding sustainability constraints.
The relationship between ~ w and w when there are binding sustainability constraints










This gives an updating rule for the ratio of the Pareto-weights. Thus given an initial
set of weights the arrangement can be computed recursively by updating the weights as
determined by the actual state and the equation given above.
To solve the above problem it is necessary to determine the conditional value functions
V i(w;r). These can be calculated using an iterative procedure starting with the …rst-best
value functions (where the sustainability constraints are ignored). We will outline this
procedure for the case considered in the main text, of two households where the states
are identically and independently distributed over time (¼sr = ¼r). It is computationally





26In the i.i.d. case with two households there are just two unconditional value functions,
one for each household.24 The Pareto-weights can be normalized so
PH
i=1 wi =1 ,s ow i t h
two households it is only necessary to calculate one weight. To distinguish this case, let µ
be the Pareto-weight for household 1 and let 1 ¡ µ be the Pareto-weight for household 2.
There is then a simple procedure for calculating the two unconditional value func-
tions, Wi(µ). First calculate the indirect utility functions vi(µ;Ys) and compute an initial








s and solve the 2S equations




for µ.T h i sg i v e sS intervals [µs;¹ µs] where µs is computed from the equations for household
1 and ¹ µs is computed from the equations for household 2. These intervals correspond to
the theoretical bounds drawn in the …gures in Section 4. New values of µ; say ~ µ; can be
computed by the rule that µ is kept constant if it falls within the interval or moves to the
n e a r e s te n d p o i n ti fi td o e sn o t . 25 This gives ~ µ as a function of µ in state s,s a y~ µs(µ).





¼s((1 ¡ ±)(vi(~ µs(µ);Y s) ¡ ui(yi
s)) + ±Wi
0(~ µs(µ)))
and the process repeated until the di¤erence between the value functions Wi
j+1(µ) and
Wi
j(µ) or the di¤erence between the interval endpoints [µs;¹ µs] at successive iterations is
arbitrarily small.26 This computation procedure and the simulation of predicted consump-
tions can be implemented with a Mathematica package.27
24In general there are HS value functions to compute.
25For a proof see Ligon, Thomas, and Worrall (1997).
26It can be shown that starting with the …rst-best value functions as described above, convergence is
assured.
27The package is available upon request. The package solves the two identical household problem with
constant relative risk aversion. It computes the solution to the perfect insurance, pure gift and dynamic
limited commitment problems and simulates predicted consumptions for each model.
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